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Abstract
The main objectives of this research are to describe the obedience towards the regulation of
timeliness financial report submission and to analyze the influence of financial performance and
corporate governance structure to timelines of financial report submission. The research
questions are tested by running Analysis of Variance (Anova) and two logistic regressions.
Timelines (measured by dummy variable, 1 if the company comply financial report submission
i.e. before and at 31 of March, while 0 for delayed submission) is the dependent variable both in
Anova and in logistic regression. The independent variables in logistic regression consist of
EAT, ROA, ROE, Leverage, concentration ownership by domestic institution, number of the
Board of Directors, number of the Board of Commissioners and Industry Classification. The first
main result of this study is that there is an increasing of timelines obedience. This suggests that
the obedience of listed companies towards the regulation of timelines is increasing form time to
time. The second main result of this study is that there is an influence of profitability (ROA),
leverage and corporate governance structure (ownership concentration by Domestic
Institution/HI_DOM) to the probability of timelines financial report submission. The positive
and negative sign of ROA and leverage respectively, suggest that higher ROA and lower
leverage tend to obey the regulation of timelines. The negative sign of HI_DOM suggest that the
lower ownership concentration by Domestic Institution tend to obey the regulation of timelines.
Keywords: corporate governance, ownership concentration, timelines, financial performance
Abstrak
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mendeskripsikan kepatuhan terhadap aturan ketepatan waktu
penyampaian laporan keuangan dan untuk menganalisis pengaruh kinerja keuangan dan struktur
corporate governance terhadap ketepatan waktu penyampaian laporan keuangan. Penelitian ini
menggunakan alat analisis anova dan 2 model regresi logistik. Variabel dependen pada dua
analisis tersebut adalah ketepatan waktu penyampaian laporan keuangan (diproksikan dengan
variabel dumi, 1 untuk perusahaan yang menyampaikan laporan keuangan tepat waktu, yaitu
sebelum dan pada tanggal 31 Maret dan 0 untuk perusahaan yang terlambat menyampaikan
laporan keuangan). Variabel independen pada model regresi logistik adalah EAT, ROA, ROE,
Leverage, konsentrasi kepemilikian oleh institusi domestik, jumlah dewan direksi, jumlah dewan
komisaris dan klasifikasi industri. Hasil penelitian pertama menunjukkan bahwa terdapat
kenaikan kepatuhan  ketepatan penyampaian laporan keuangan. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa
kepatuhan perusahaan publik terhadap aturan ketepatan waktu penyampaian laporan keuangan
adalah meningkat dari tahun ke tahun. Hasil penelitian kedua menunjukkan bahwa terdapat
pengaruh antara profitabilitas (ROA), leverage dan struktur corporate governance (konsentrasi
kepemilikan oleh institusi domestik/HI_DOM) terhadap probabilitas ketepatan waktu
penyampaian laporan keuangan. Tanda positif dan negatif dari ROA dan leverage, menunjukkan
bawah semakin tinggi ROA dan semakin rendah leverage cenderung untuk mentaati aturan
ketepatan waktu. Tanda negatif dari HI_DOM menunjukkan bahwa semakin rendah konsentrasi
kepemilikan oleh institusi domestik cenderung untuk  mentaati aturan ketepatan waktu.
Kata kunci: corporate governance, ownership concentration, timelines, financial performance




There is a considerable debate about what actually constitute corporate governance, but its
key elements concern the enhancement of corporate performance via the supervision, or
monitoring of management performance and ensuring the accountability of management to
shareholders and other stakeholders (Keasey and Wright, 1997). Good corporate governance is,
thus, as much concerned with correctly motivating managerial behavior towards improving the
business, as directly controlling the behavior of managers.
The need of supervision and accountability of directors arises because of the so-called
divorce between ownership and control in large enterprises with diffuse ownership (Berle and
Means, 1934; Hart, 1995). Supervision may take various forms ranging from systems where
shareholders are outsiders with little direct incentive to monitor management, to systems where
shareholders are insiders with very close involvement in the management enterprise. Prowsen
(1998), instead, states that corporate governance is a tool to ensure that the boards of directors
and managers (insiders) give their best performance in the interests of external investors
(creditors and shareholders).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published OECD
principles of Corporate Governance in 1999 and updated in 2004. The Principles are intended to
assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal,
institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries and to provide
guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that
have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance. The Principles focus on
publicly traded companies, both financial and non-financial. However, to the extent they are
deemed applicable, they might also be a useful tool to improve corporate governance in non-
traded companies, for example, privately held and state owned enterprises. The Principles
represent a common basis that OECD member countries consider essential for the development
of good governance practices. They are intended to be concise, understandable and accessible to
the international community. They are not intended to substitute for government, semi-
government or private sector initiatives to develop more detailed “best practice” in corporate
governance.
The Principles presented in the first part of the document (OECD, 2004) cover the
following areas: a) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework,
Corporate Governance Framework The corporate governance framework should promote
transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.
b) The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions, the corporate governance framework
should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. c) The equitable treatment of
shareholders, the corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. d) The role of stakeholders,
the corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by
law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. e)
Disclosure and transparency, The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company, f) The
responsibilities of the board, The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s
accountability to the company and the shareholders.
Indonesia has The National Committee on Governance (NCG) that was established on 30
November 2004 by virtue of the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (Keputusan
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Menteri Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian No: KEP-49/M.EKON/11/TAHUN 2004) to replace
the former Komite Nasional Kebijakan Good Corporate Governance (National Committee on
Good Corporate Governance) which was set up in 1999. Lately, the Coordinating Minister for
Economic Affairs has reconfirmed the Decree No. KEP-14/ M.EKON/03/TAHUN 2008. NCG’s
goal is to propagate the acceptance and application of Good Corporate Governance (GCG)
principles nationwide and establish Indonesia’s reputation as a country where high standards of
corporate governance are firmly embedded throughout the economy in public and corporate
administrations.
NCG published GCG Codes in 2001 and then revised it in 2006, based on the revision of
Principles Corporate Governance in 2004 by OECD. One (among another 6) of the GCG Code
purpose is achieving sustainable growth of the company through a management system based on
the principles of transparency, accountability, responsibility, independency and fairness.
Transparency is one of the key principles of GCG, applied in many countries including
Indonesia. This principles states that corporate governance framework should ensure that timely
and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the
financial situation, performance and governance of the company (OECD, 2004).  Therefore, this
principle does not only prioritize content and information, it further relates to the timeliness of
information submission. One of the essential types of information submission is the audited
annual financial report. The report contains financial and non-financial information. Base on
NCG (2006)’s Codes of GCG, one of the code provisions in transparency is that a company must
provide timely, appropriate, clear, accurate and comparable information accessible to
stakeholders that commensurate with their rights.
Timeliness of financial report submission is a very important aspect of an investment
decision making process. A delay in financial report submission will diminish relevance of the
information content. Many researchers have studied the timeliness of financial report
submission, but most focused on the analysis of financial performance, based only on book
values or market values. Thus, this research studies the relationship between timeliness of
financial report submission, company financial performance and corporate governance structure,
since the timelines in financial report submission is one of the corporate governance principles.
This research studies the relationship between timeliness of financial report submission (one of
the code provisions in transparency), company financial performance and corporate governance
structure in Indonesian listed companies. Specifically, the objectives of this research are as
follows: a) to describe the obedience towards the regulation of timeliness, and b) to analyze the
influence of financial performance and corporate governance structure to timelines.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Corporate Governance
The potential conflict of interest between owners and managers has been extensively
discussed in literature, particularly since the seminal work of Berle and Means (1934) and as the
management-controlled form with diffused ownership has progressively become the dominant
organizational form in North America and the UK (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). In widely held
firm, owner provide the risk capital, while managers are responsible for making strategic and
operational decisions which internally allocate and deploy these resources. This does not pose a
serious problem if shareholders are able to monitor managers easily and cheaply and make them
accountable for their actions. The problem of accountability generally arises because the
executives will normally have a distinct information advantage over diffused owners.
According to Judge (2010), there is a wide variety of governance mechanisms used
throughout the world. Previous literature has suggested that economies vary in terms of their
emphasis on formal rules versus informal. In Anglo-American economies, for example, the
primary governance mechanism is the equity market. In Western European and some Asian
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economies, however, the primary governance mechanism is relatively concentrated ownership
patterns via pyramidal ownership structures but Scandinavian economies appear to rely on social
norms and expectations to a great extent. In transition economies, like China, the primary
governance mechanism is the state and informal networks. In India, business groups provide
accountability, especially in the larger firms. While Abor, Graham, and Yawson (2011), suggest
corporate governance is an integrated set of internal and external mechanisms that harmonize
conflicts of interest resulting from the separation of ownership and control. They argue that the
relevance of governance must be reflected in the strategic restructuring choices corporations
make post-takeover. Corporate governance is one of a multifaceted monitoring mechanism
which, taken together, may explain the restructuring choices of the newly combined firm. The
literature suggests that firms with fewer board members relative to its size, greater managerial
ownership, higher outside representation on the board and lower levels of anti-takeover
provisions are seen as displaying effective governance.
Chen, Chung, Hsu, and Wu (2010), using longitudinal data from 1990 to 2005 predict that
the corporate governance-firm value relationship is strongest for those firms with a high external
financing need and relatively weak otherwise. Indeed, they do find external financing need to be
positively related to the quality of corporate governance mechanisms in the firm, and that the
greater the external need, the stronger the relationship. However, they report that firm value is
positively related to subsequent internal corporate governance quality, not vice versa. As such,
this longitudinal dataset confirms some expectations and creates some new questions to be
explored.
Boytsun, Andriy, Deloof, and Matthyssens (2011) investigate whether various informal
constraints – as manifested in social norms and social cohesion – are related to firm-level
corporate governance. They analyzed the data from a single country (Ukraine) in order to
examine the relationship between cross-province variation in social norms and social cohesion
and variation in corporate governance. They found that corporate governance is likely to be more
open in communities with stronger social norms and higher cohesion. The evidence also suggests
that social cohesion may be a mechanism that mediates the hypothesized effect of social norms
on governance. These findings suggest that informal rules have a substantial direct impact on
corporate governance, meaning that a corporate governance reform focused solely on legal rules
is likely to be limited at best. If informal rules matter, then the policy should take them into
account and consist of adapting the corporate governance system to them. Moreover, if informal
rules differ internationally, so will the corporate governance systems. In their study, open
corporate governance refers to transparency, external monitoring, and more developed bonding
between management and shareholders (and is generally consistent with dispersed ownership).
While closed corporate governance refers to opaqueness, internal monitoring, and little bonding
(and is consistent with concentrated ownership). Open corporate governance would be generally
termed “good” in the Anglo-Saxon literature, corporate governance codes, and best-practice
recommendations, while closed corporate governance would be labeled “poor.” The implicit
assumption in this literature is that more transparent corporate governance is good for firm
performance. This study supports the statement that concentrated ownership in Domestic
Institution is closed corporate governance and labeled poor governance.
2.2. Timeliness of Financial Reports Submission
According to Karim and Ahmed (2005), timeliness has long been recognized as one of the
qualitative attributes of general purpose financial reports. The body of literature on financial
reporting timeliness can be categorized into two broad categories: studies attempting to identify
the determinants of audit delay and studies on the association between information content and
timeliness. The first category of studies generally assumes that cross section variation in audit
delay is not a random phenomenon. It is functionally related to certain client and auditor
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attributes. The corporate attributes examined in the first category of studies include size,
profitability, leverage, audit risk, audit complexity, fiscal year end, listing status, industry sector,
quality of internal control, dividend, presence of extraordinary items, presence of contingencies,
ownership, financial condition, correction of earnings, company age etc. The auditor attributes
examined include auditor size, type of audit opinion, auditor’s international link, audit
technology, auditor change, incremental audit effort, etc.
The second category of studies tend to argue that if accounting reports have information
content they must cause the market to react to that information. Karim and Ahmed (2005) also
argue that reactions surrounding announcement period should be different from that in non
announcement period (Beaver, 1968). These studies mainly examine whether timeliness is
associated with information content, i.e., whether bad news is systematically delayed (Kross,
1981 and Givoly and Palmon, 1982) and whether market reacts differently to early and late
release of information (Kross, 1982; Zeghal, 1984; Kross and Schroeder, 1984, and Chambers
and Penman, 1984). Empirical research on timeliness of financial reporting provides evidence
that the degree of timeliness of information release has information content (Beaver, 1968) and
affects firm value (Kross and Schroeder, 1984; Hambers and Penman, 1984; Givoly and Palmon,
1982; Schwartz and Soo, 1996). Thus, this study can be categorized as the first category since
this study examines timelines and the corporate attributes such as size, profitability, leverage,
industry sector, ownership and financial condition.
Timeliness has been recognized to be one of the characteristics that determine the
relevance of accounting information (Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2003). They examine the
timeliness of quarterly financial reports published by companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange (KLSE); extend prior research by determining the association between
timeliness and each of the following company attributes - size, profitability, growth and capital
structure. Their study shows that profitability and growth of a company are negatively associated
with the reporting lag of a company at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels of significance,
respectively. This implies that there have been tendencies for companies with good news to
report faster than companies with bad news. The findings are consistent with the “conventional
wisdom” which suggests that bad news takes longer to reach the public than good news. The
results also support the ‘stakeholder theory’, which suggests that in the absence of an opportunity
to hide bad news because of mandatory disclosure, managers have the incentive to delay bad
news.
Bowen et al. (1992) documented that US firms with bad news announced earnings later
than expected while firms with good news announced earnings earlier than expected. They
argued that managers have an incentive to minimize the adverse reaction of stakeholders to bad
news, thus delaying the announcement of bad news. Studies undertaken by Courtis (1976),
Givoly and Palmon (1982), Bowen et al. (1992) and Haw (2000) suggested that earnings
announcements containing good news might be advanced and bad news tended to be delayed.
Several reasons have been advanced in the literature as to why bad news is delayed. Givoly and
Palmon (1982) argued that it is the managers’ natural desire “to defer any repercussions from
shareholders”, and managers “wish to continue and complete recent negotiations and contracts in
the best possible light” (p. 490).
In Indonesia, Wiwik (1996) examined factors that influence the delay of  financial reports
submission. The result showed that profitability influences timeliness. Naim (1999) examined
companies’ disobedience towards the regulation of timeliness in public company financial report
submission. He analyzed the variables of sales, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE)
and profit growth. The results show that only the return on assets (ROA) has significant
influence on timeliness. In the analysis of market performance carried out by Priyastiwi (2002),
result shows that abnormal profit significantly influences the timeliness of financial report
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submission. The higher abnormal profit is, the higher the probability that companies meet the
timeliness of financial report submission.
Supporting Ku Ismail and Chandler (2003), Courtis (1976), Givoly and Palmon (1982),
Bowen et al. (1992) and Haw (2000) the proposition of this study is that the companies with
good news of financial performance tend to report financial statement faster than companies with
bad news. Two companies’ attributes as in Ku Ismail and Chandler (2003), size and profitability
are analyzed to determine timelines in this study. Size of a company has been measured by
various ways and two of the commonly used measures are total assets and sales. The first
describes company's financial condition while the second described company’s financial
performance. Accordingly, this study measures size by the company’s total assets and sales.
Profit margin used to measure profitability in Ku Ismail and Chandler (2003), while Naim (1999)
measured profitability by the company’s ROE and ROA. This study combines both studies,
using earning after tax (EAT), ROA and ROE to measure profitability.
3. Research Method
This section explains the population and sampling, variable measurement and research
model. Variable measurement refers to share ownership, firm performance, and timeliness of
financial report submission.
3.1. Samples
Samples in this study are public companies, listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange in
1999-2007. The samples are selected using   purposive sampling, base on the following criteria:
a. The financial statement data are available for the reporting year 1999 – 2007.
b. The sample firms publish audited financial statements using reporting period ended on
December 31.
3.2. Research Variables and Data
a. Corporate Governance structure is measured by ownership structures, number of board
of commissioners and number of board of directors. Ownership in this study is
institutional ownership institutions proportion by domestic institution (PT Domestik).
Proportion ownership by domestic institutions used to measure ownership
concentration using herfindahl index (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Claessens, 1997).
Herfindahl index domestic institution (HI_DOM) is the sum of square from proportion
by domestic institution, compute using the following formula:
n




HI_DOM : Herfindahl Index of domestic institution
Proportion of DIi : Ownership proportion by domestic institution
n : Number of domestic institution
b. Company’s profitability is measured by Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity
(ROE) and Earnings after Tax (EAT).
c. Timeliness is measured by dummy variable, 1 if the company comply financial report
submission i.e. before and at 31 of March, while 0 for delayed submission.
d. Control variables consist of size, leverage and industry. Size is measured by Assets
and Sales, leverage is measured by total debt to total assets ratio and industry is
measured by dummy variable, 1 for manufacture and 0 for services.
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Financial report data and company data are gained from the Indonesian Capital Market
Directory (ICMD). Timeliness of the financial report submission data is gained from the Pusat
Referensi Pasar Modal (Stock Exchange Reference Center) of Bursa Efek Indonesia (Indonesian
Stock Exchange).
3.3. Statistical Tools
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is run to describe the obedience towards the regulation of
timeliness from time to time. The dependent variable is timelines while the independent variable
is year. The obedience of listed company should increase from time to time, since the regulation
had announced years ago, such as the article No. 86 Law No. 8 of 1995 about reporting and
information, Securities Acts No. KEP-80/PM/1996 about periodic (annual and semiannual)
financial reporting, GCG Codes in 2001 and then revised in 2006 by NCG.
Logistic regression model is run to analyze the impact of corporate governance structure
and financial performance on the timeliness of financial report submission, as follows:
TLit = β0+ β1Ait + β2Sit + β3EATit+ β4ROAit + β5ROEit + β6LEVit + β7HI_DOMit +
β8NDIRit + β9NCOMit + β10MANUFit +ui
To analyze the impact of corporate governance structure on the relation between financial
performance and timeliness of financial report submission, logistic regression model is used, as
follows:
TLit = β0+ β1Ait + β2Sit + β3EATit+ β4ROAit + β5ROEit + β6LEVit + β7HI_DOMit + β8NDIRit +






EAT : Earning After Tax
ROA : Return on Assets
ROE : Return on Equity
LEV : Leverage
HI_DOM : Herfindahl Index company ownership by institutions (domestic companies)
NDIR : Number of the board of directors
NCOM : Number of the board of commissioners
MANUF : Dummy Manufacture Industry (1 for Manufacture and 0 for service)
HI_DOM*A : Interaction Variable 1, between Herfindahl Index and Assets
HI_DOM*S : Interaction Variable 2, between Herfindahl Index and Sales
HI_DOM*EAT : Interaction Variable 3, between Herfindahl Index and EAT
u : residual value
4. Results and Discussions
4.1. Descriptive Statistic
Table 1 describes the data used in the analysis. Total Assets, Sales and EAT are
denominated in million rupiah, while ROA, ROE, LEV are ratio. Timelines and manufacture are
dummy variables, consist of 1 and 0.
Tri Gunarsih
8
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean
A (Assets) in Million Rup 306 319,086,000 4,509,833.89
S (Sales) in Million Rup -237,546 70,183,000 1,450,466.97
EAT (Earning After Tax) in Million Rup -7,002,010 11,048,800 112,203.49
ROA -9.87 4.68 0.01
ROE -40.92 12.08 0.03
LEV (Leverage) -0.01 9.05 0.67
HI_DOM (H I DOMESTIC) 0.00 0.96 0.18
TL (Timelines) 0 1 0.52
D_MANUF 0 1 0.49
NDIR (number of directors) 2 18 4.59
NCOM (number of commissioners) 2 17 4.26
4.2. Obedience toward Regulation of Timeliness
Anova is run to test the obedience of listed companies towards the regulation of timeliness
from 1999 until 2007. Since the regulation had announced years ago, then the obedience should
be increasing. Table 2 is the result of Anova. F value is 208.916, significant at α 1%. This
suggests that there is a difference of timelines from 1999 until 2007.
Table 2. ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean
Square
F Sig.
TIMELINES Between Groups 234.066 8 29.258 208.916 0.000
Within Groups 296.481 1117 .140
Total 530.548 2125
Table 3 is the result of multiple comparison, explains the differences of timelines between
years. The differences of timelines between years exist when the result of comparison is
statistically significant (column 5). Almost all comparison is statistically significant. Only
comparisons between 1999 and 2000, 1999 and 2001, 2000 and 2001, 2002 and 2004, 2002 and
2005, 2002 and 2007, 2004 and 2005 and also 2005 and 2007 that are not statistically significant,
while another comparisons are statistically significant at 1 percent  levels of significance (***)
at 5 percent  levels of significance (**). This suggests that there are differences of timelines
obedience between years.
The sign of mean difference in column 4 explains whether obedience is increasing or
decreasing. If the sign is negative, then the difference between column 2 and column 3 is
negative, suggests that there is an increasing value. All signs in column 4 that statistically
significant are negative, except the sign of comparison between 2002 with 2003 and 2002 with
2006. This suggest that there are increasing obedience of timelines between years except 9
comparisons (7 is not statistically significant and 2 is statistically significant but decreasing
value). Each comparison between years is as in Table 4.
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Table 3. Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable (I) YEAR (J) YEAR Mean Difference (I-J) Sig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






























2004 2005 -0.06 1.000
***2006 0.31 0.000
***2007 -0.11 0.177
2005 ***2006 0.37 0.000
2007 -0.05 1.000
2006 ***2007 -0.42 0.000
Note: ***1 percent levels of significance ** 5 percent levels of significance.
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Table 4. Multiple Comparisons Summary
Comparison between Year Differences
1999 and 2000, 1999 and 2001, 2000 and 2001,
2002 and 2004, 2002 and 2005, 2002 and 2006,
2002 and 2007, 2003 and 2004, 2004 and 2005,
2005 and 2007
there is no timelines obedience difference
1999 and 2003,1999 and 2004,1999 and 2005,
1999 and 2006, 1999 and 2007, 2000 and 2002,
2000 and 2003, 2000 and 2004, 2000 and 2005,
2000 and 2006, 2001 and 2002, 2001 and 2003,
2001 and 2004, 2001 and 2005, 2001 and 2006,
2001 and 2007, 2002 and 2003, 2003 and 2005,
2003 and 2007, 2004 and 2006, 2004 and 2007,
2005 and 2006, 2006 and 2007
there is an increasing in timelines obedience at 1
percent  levels of significance
2003 and 2006 there is an increasing in timelines obedience at 5
percent  levels of significance
Those comparisons above suggest that there is an increasing of timelines obedience. This
suggests that the obedience of listed companies towards the regulation of timelines is increasing.
4.3. Empirical Model
Empirical model was analyzed by testing two logistic regression models. The first one did
not use a moderation variables and the second one did.
4.3.1. The First Logistic Regression Model
The first logistic regression model is as follows (model 2):
TLit = β0+ β1Ait + β2Sit + β3EATit+ β4ROAit + β5ROEit + β6LEVit + β7HI_DOMit +
β8NDIRit + β9NCOMit + β10MANUFit +ui
a. Parameter Estimation and Interpretation
The results of the parameter estimation are shown in Table 5. The analysis of parameter
estimation shows that there are 2 variables influence to timeliness of financial report submission.
ROA and Leverage are influence to the probability of timeliness of financial report submission at
the 5 percent and 1 percent level of significance respectively. Other variables, assets, sales, EAT,
ROE, industry, and corporate governance structure are not statistically significant.
This result shows that the probability of timeliness of company’s financial report
submission is related only to ROA and leverage. This suggests that the higher the ROA, the
higher the probability of timelines while the lower the leverage, the higher the probability of
timelines.
Higher ROA means good news in financial performance while higher leverage means bad
news of financial performance. Thus, this result supports Ku Ismail and Chandler (2003), Courtis
(1976), Givoly and Palmon (1982), Bowen et al. (1992) and Haw (2000), that the companies
with good news of financial performance tend to report financial statement faster than companies
with bad news. This study also supports Naim (1999).
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Table 5. Variable in Model (2)
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Assets 0.000 0.000 0.020 1 0.887 1.000
Sales 0.000 0.000 0.002 1 0.969 1.000
EAT 0.000 0.000 0.488 1 0.485 1.000
ROA 0.980 0.478 4.195 1 0.041 2.663
ROE 0.027 0.040 0.469 1 0.493 1.028
Leverage -0.525 0.127 16.986 1 0.000 .592
HI__DOM -0.423 0.279 2.310 1 0.129 .655
MANUF -0.050 0.109 0.211 1 0.646 .951
NDIR -0.022 0.035 0.391 1 0.532 .978
NCOM -0.051 0.039 1.765 1 0.184 .950
Constant 0.708 0.188 14.242 1 0.000 2.030
b. Prediction
Table 6 describes the result of prediction. In this analysis, the companies  split into 2
groups, first group (1) if the company comply financial report submission i.e. before and at 31 of
March, while second group (0) for delayed submission. All of companies in the first group (1)
are predicted as delayed submission companies (0) while all companies in the second group (0)
are predicted as delayed submission companies (0). Overall, the accuracy in predicting timelines
of financial report submission is 50.5%.
Table 6. Classification of Observed Values and Prediction
4.3.2. The Second Logistic Regression Model
The second logistic regression model is as follows (model 3):
TLit = β0+ β1Ait + β2Sit + β3EATit+ β4ROAit + β5ROEit + β6LEVit + β7HI_DOMit + β8NDIRit +
β9NCOMit + β10MANUFit + β11HI_DOM*Ait +β12HI_DOM*Sit + β13HI_DOM*EATit +
ui
a. Parameter Estimation and Interpretation
The results of the parameter estimation are shown in table 7. The analysis of parameter
estimation shows that there are 4 variables influence to timeliness of financial report submission.
ROA, Leverage, HI_DOM and HI_DOM*EAT influence the probability of timeliness of
financial report submission at the 10%, 1%, 10% and 10% level of significance respectively.
Other variables, assets, sales, EAT, ROE, industry, NDIR, NCOM, HI_DOM*S and
HI_DOM*A are not statistically significant.
This result shows that the probability of timeliness of company’s financial report
submission is related only to ROA, leverage, HI_DOM (Ownership concentration by Domestic
Institution). This suggests that the higher the ROA, the higher the probability of timelines while
the lower the leverage and ownership concentration by Domestic Institution, the higher the
probability of timelines. Ownership concentration by Domestic Institution will reduce the
probability of timelines.
Predicted  TL Percentage Correct
0 1
Observed TL 0 742 0 100.0
1 728 0 .0
Overall Percentage
The cut value is .500 50.5
Tri Gunarsih
12
Table 7. Variable in Model (3)
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Assets 0.000 0.000 1.392 1 0.238 1.000
Sales 0.000 0.000 0.047 1 0.828 1.000
EAT 0.000 0.000 0.573 1 0.449 1.000
ROA 0.866 0.478 3.275 1 0.070 2.376
ROE 0.025 0.040 0.400 1 0.527 1.026
Leverage -0.527 0.128 17.010 1 0.000 0.591
HI__DOM -0.556 0.309 3.240 1 0.072 0.573
MANUF -0.064 0.109 0.345 1 0.557 0.938
NDIR -0.019 0.035 0.281 1 0.596 0.982
NCOM -0.058 0.039 2.191 1 0.139 0.944
HI_DOM*EAT 0.000 0.000 3.050 1 0.081 1.000
HI_DOM*S 0.000 0.000 0.026 1 0.873 1.000
HI_DOM*A 0.000 0.000 1.724 1 0.189 1.000
Constant 0.750 0.190 15.518 1 0.000 2.116
Higher ROA means good news in financial performance while higher leverage means bad
news of financial performance. Thus, this result supports Ku Ismail and Chandler (2003), Courtis
(1976), Givoly and Palmon (1982), Bowen et al. (1992) and Haw (2000), that the companies
with good news of financial performance tend to report financial statement faster than companies
with bad news. The result of this study also supports the statement that concentrated ownership
in Domestic Institution is closed corporate governance and labeled poor governance (Boytsun,
Andriy, Deloof, and  Matthyssens, 2011).
b. Prediction
Table 8 describes the result of prediction in model (4). This analysis also splits into 2
groups, first group (1) if the company comply financial report submission i.e. before and at 31 of
March, while second group (0) for delayed submission. The number of companies in the first
group (1) that are predicted as delayed submission companies (0) is 281 companies, while 441
are correctly predicted as the company comply financial report submission. The number of
companies in the second group (0) that are correctly predicted as delayed submission companies
(0) is 391 companies, while 351 are predicted as the company that comply financial report
submission. Overall, the accuracy in predicting timelines of financial report submission is 57%.
Table 8. Classification of Observed Values and Prediction
4.4. Discussion
The first main result of this study is that there is an increasing of timelines obedience. This
suggests that the obedience of listed companies towards the regulation of timelines is increasing
form time to time. This supports the argument that the obedience of listed company should
increase from time to time, since the regulation had announced years ago, such as the article No,
86 Law No. 8 of 1995 about reporting and information, Securities Acts No. KEP-80/PM/1996
about periodic (annual and semiannual) financial reporting, GCG Codes in 2001 and then revised
in 2006 by NCG.
The second main result of this study is that there is an influence of profitability (ROA),
leverage and corporate governance structure (ownership concentration by Domestic Institution)
Predicted  TL Percentage Correct
0 1
Observed TL 0 391 351 52.7
1 281 447 61.4
Overall Percentage
The cut value is .500 57.0
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to the probability of timelines financial report submission. The positive and negative sign of
ROA and leverage respectively, suggest that higher ROA and lower leverage tend to obey the
regulation of timelines.  Higher ROA means good news in financial performance while higher
leverage means bad news of financial performance (lower leverage means good news in financial
performance). This suggests that the companies with good news of financial performance tend to
report financial statement faster than companies with bad news
The negative sign of HI_DOM suggest that the lower ownership concentration by
Domestic Institution tend to obey the regulation of timelines. The result supports the statement
that concentrated ownership in Domestic Institution is closed corporate governance and labeled
poor governance (Boytsun, Andriy, Deloof, and Matthyssens, 2011).
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